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18 March 57
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SC # 01847/58

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SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE
AND AIR-RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION

I. CIA report, Soviet Civil Defense and Air-Raid Shelter Construction, distributed to the National Security Council 14 March in response to NSC action _____. Conclusions of this report were concurred in by the intelligence community.

II. Since my briefing on 15 January, the intelligence community has engaged in an extensive collection effort on this subject, and valuable additional information has been received from NSA, and from various sources of State, the Military Services, and CIA.

A. New Evidence

1. Good evidence that Soviets have been and are continuing to install shelter doors in the Moscow Subway [REDACTED] 25X9
Unconfirmed reports that Soviets also plan to use Baku Subway as a shelter [REDACTED] 25X9

3. A number of reports identified exceptionally heavy basements in several Soviet Government buildings and railway stations. In some cases, these were specifically identified as air-raid shelters [REDACTED] 25X9

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4. Shelters were reported in several industrial enterprises

25X9 [REDACTED]

5. Several sources reported on basement shelter construction in progress in late 1956 and early 1957 during which certain shelters were refurbished and steps were taken to install ventilating equipment [REDACTED]

25X9 [REDACTED] Basement shelters were also reported in new apartment buildings in Baku and Odessa [REDACTED]

6. Sources have reported: civil defense training in several Soviet factories and a number of city-wide blackout drills [REDACTED]

7. The Soviets officially announced recently that 85.5 percent of the population had completed a civil defense "anti-atomic" training course and that two more advanced courses are scheduled for the entire population, to be completed in 1958 and 1960.

8. In re-interrogating several members of the U.S. Housing Delegation, it was learned that apartment basements seen on their conducted tours could not be identified as basement shelters. On two occasions, however, when members of the delegation departed from the conducted tour basement shelters were observed.

B. Difficulty of Observation

In my January briefing on this subject, I stressed the difficulty of collecting hard facts on this subject. Soviet civil defense activities are

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under security wraps and even trained observers have difficulty identifying shelters. This, in part, accounts for a large number of negative reports from the field on these activities.

III. Conclusions. Weighing all the available evidence, the conclusions of the intelligence community are substantially the same as those expressed in my January briefing.

A. No firm estimate on number of persons afforded shelter protection--believe a minimum of 10 to 15 millions of the urban population of 74 million are afforded at least partial protection--could run higher.

B. Clear that Soviet civilians have much more shelter available than U.S. civilians*.

C. Shelters which might survive nuclear attack and remain air-tight and equipped with adequate filtered ventilation would substantially reduce casualties from fall-out.

D. The Soviet shelter program is a sustained effort and will probably be continued in the future--there is no evidence that its completion is geared to any future target date for the initiation of hostilities.

IV. My last briefing on this subject and the recent CIA report reviewed some of the evidence supporting these conclusions. Official Soviet


*Not discussed by U.S. intelligence community nor is this conclusion in the CIA report. It was included as a conclusion in your briefing to the NSC.

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publications and communications intelligence attest to the existence of the Soviet program, including the program for shelter construction. There is concrete evidence from hundreds of eyewitness reports, PW's, defectors, as well as from members of the U.S. Housing Delegation who have observed civil defense shelters.



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V. The uncertainty surrounding many aspects of the Soviet shelter and civil defense programs is well recognized and the intelligence effort on this subject will continue to have high priority.

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